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Wilbanks: Constitutional Law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

VERNON v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.:
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYER MAY
INVESTIGATE EMPLOYEE'S RELIGIOUS
BELIEFS TO DETERMINE WHETHER
BELIEFS AFFECT JOB PERFORMANCE
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, et al.,l the Ninth Circuit
held that the city of Los Angeles' investigation of its assistant
police chiefs religious beliefs did not violate his state or federal
civil rights. 2
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In November of 1991, Robert L. Vernon, a thirty-eight year
veteran3 of the Los Angeles Police Department (hereinafter
"LAPD"), held the position of Assistant Chief of Police.' Since
1984, Vernon has also served as an elder for the Grace Community Church (hereinafter "the Church"), a fundamentalist
religious organization located in Sun Valley, California. 5
1. Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, et aI., 27 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1994) (per
Fletcher, J., joined by Nelson, J., and Will, J., District Judge for the N.D. of Ill.,
sitting by designation).
2. Id. at 1388.
3. Appellant's Brief at 6, Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385 (9th
Cir.) (No. 92-55473) (1994).
4. Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1994). In 1991
as Assistant Chief of Police of the LAPD, Vernon was second in command to Chief
of Police, Daryl Gates, and was responsible for eighty-five percent of operations for
the LAPD police force. Id.
5. Id. In 1991, the Grace Community Church had between 8,000 to 9,000
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On May 5, 1991, an article in the Los Angeles Magazine
criticized Vernon's involvement in the Church. 6 Quoting from
audio tapes Vernon had made for the Church fifteen years
earlier, the article portrayed Vernon as a man who condemned
homosexuality, depicted police officers as "ministers of God,"
and admonished men to "recognize the concepts of disciplining
followers, whether it be your son, employees or anyone under
your control-your wife."7
After the publication of the article, Defendant Zev
Yaroslavsky, a city councilman responsible for the LAPD, met
with Michael Yamaki, a Los Angeles police commissioner.s
Both men agreed to conduct an investigation to determine
whether Vernon's religious beliefs had improperly affected his
job performance. 9 Defendant Stanley Sheinbaum, a Los Angeles police commissioner, then publicly questioned whether
Vernon still held the alleged views and whether those views
were affecting his job performance. 10

members. John Dart, Pastor's Blunt Words Roil Christian Waters, L.A. TIMES, Sep·
tember 6, 1991, at B 1.
6. The Dan Quayle Principle Strikes Again, Los ANGELES MAGAZINE, May 21,
1991, at 28. The article was one item in a one page layout entitled "Trends and
Talk in Town." (One newspaper described the magazine section as a "local gossip
column." Sally Ann Stewart, LA's Deputy Chief Has Troubles, Too, U.S.A. TODAY,
May 28, 1991, at 2A). The Los Angeles Magazine is a regional periodical published
monthly with a circulation of approximately 173,000. BILL KATZ AND LINDA
STERNBERG KATZ, Magazines for Libraries, 267 (R.R. Bowker, publ., 7th Ed. 1992).
7. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1388. See Sally Ann Stewart, supra note 6, at 2A. The
audio tapes quoted from were part of a six·part series endorsed by the Church
and taught by Vernon in a religious class; the tapes were entitled "The True Mas·
culine Role." Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1388.
8. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1388. This meeting occurred on May 22, 1991, at a city
council meeting to confirm Michael Yamaki as a police commissioner. Id.
9. Id. at 1389. Yaroslavsky had allegedly uncovered evidence suggesting that:
(1) Vernon had made an unauthorized investigation of Chief of Police Daryl Gates
because "God wants me to be chief;" (2) Vernon was unfair in his hiring and promoting practices, and advanced church members before others; (3) Vernon was
known as a "bible thumper" and head of the LAPD "God Squad;" (4) Vernon had
been influenced by his religious beliefs when dealing with issues of abortion, homosexuality and female officers within the LAPD; (5) Vernon pressured officers to
attend church services; and (6) Vernon used religious symbols in official LAPD
correspondence. Id. Vernon's lawyer denied, among other things, that Vernon said
anything about God wanting him to be chief. Bill Boyarsky, The Battle Within the
LAPD, L.A. TIMES, February 7, 1992, at B 2.
10. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1389. This public questioning occurred on May 25,
1991. Id.
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Yaroslavsky sent a letter listing his allegations to Defendant Melanie Lomax, acting President of the Board of Police
Commissioners (hereinafter "the Board"), requesting an investigation. 11 Yaroslavsky then released this letter to the
press. 12
On June 4, 1991, the Board voted unanimously to request
an investigation into Yaroslavsky's allegations. 13 The Board
sent a memorandum to Police Chief Daryl Gates which stated
in part: "[The] Board wishes only to ensure that Chief Vernon's
personal beliefs have not created any adverse impact on any
job-related matters and that he has not violated any Department policies or procedures."14
As a result of the Board's memorandum, Chief Gates began an investigation. 15 According to Gates, the investigation
focused entirely on Vernon's on-duty conduct. 16 On November
26, 1991, after a five-month probe, the investigation was terminated and the Board took no further action with respect to the
allegations concerning Vernon. 17

Between May 1991 and the filing of the complaint, approximately 33 articles concerning the investigation of Vernon
appeared in many prominent national newspapers and periodicals. ls On at least one occasion, information concerning the
11. Id. In the letter, Yaroslavsky wrote that Vernon was "entitled to his personal religious and political views . . . However, when one's views interfere with
one's ability to perform official duties fairly ... it is no longer a personal matter,
but a matter of public policy. Allegations ... deserve to be reviewed." Id.
12. Id. Yaroslavsky released the letter on May 3, 1991. Yamaki then released
the letter to the press. Vernon responded by appearing on a local news station
stating that, "[D)iscriminating against anyone because of their religious beliefs is
against the law and deprives them of their civil rights." Appellant's Brief at 10,
Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir.) (No. 92-55473) (1994).
13. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1389. Both Sheinbaum and Lomax made public statements. For example, Sheinbaum stated that it bothered him that "some allegations
do claim [his religious beliefl has impacted on his role as Assistant Police Chief."
Id.
14. Id. at 1390.
15. Id. During the five months of investigation, the contents of the investigation were not disclosed to Vernon or to the public. Id.
16. Id. The court notes that "apparently no specific inquiry was made into
Vernon's religious beliefs." Id.
17. Id. at 1390. Chief Gates formally reported to the Board that none of the
allegations could be substantiated. Id.
18. See, e.g., Henry Weinstein, Vernon Granted Trial on Claim He 18 Victim of

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995

3

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 12

208

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:205

investigation was televised on a nationally syndicated talk
show. 19
On November 4,1991, Vernon filed an action in Los Angeles District Court against the City of Los Angeles, the City
Council, the Board, Yaroslavsky, Sheinbaum, Brewer, and
Lomax, claiming that the government's investigation had violated his First Amendment right to freedom of religious belief.20 Vernon alleged that the pre-investigation activities and
the investigation itself violated his federal constitutional rights
under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the
First Amendment,21 the Due Process 22 and Equal
Protection23 Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Article I, Section 4 of the California Constitution. 24
Furthermore, Vernon claimed that the actions of the deReligious Bias, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1992, at B3. Sally Ann Stewart, LA. 's Deputy
Chief Has Troubles, Too, U.S.A. TODAY, May 28, 1991, at 2A. Garry Abrams, Don't
Pack God in Your Lunch Box, S.F. CHRON., July 30, 1991, at D3. Associated
Press, No. 2 L.A. Cop Faces Scrutiny for Preaching Views on Women, Gays Prompt
Call for Probe, S.F. CHRON., May 24, 1991, at A25. David Freed, 'Born-Again'
Christians Who Also Carry a Badge, Piety in the Ranks Raises Concern in LAPD,
L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1987, at B 1.
19. Sheinbaum appeared on the nationally televised talk show "Geraldo" to
discuss information regarding the investigation. Appellant's Brief at 15 n.5, Vernon
v. City of Los Angeles, et al., 27 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir.) (No. 92-55473) (1994).
20. Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1994). Vernon
asked for relief in the amount of ten million dollars. See, Bill Boyarsky, The Battle
Within the LAPD, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1992, at B2. See also, Andrea Ford, Vernon
Loses Injunction Try in Flap Over Religion, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1991, at B3. The
attorney hired by Vernon, David Casterline, had successfully defended against a
Wisconsin law that required members of the Amish Church to send their children
to public school after the eighth grade. The case was a landmark one in the area
of freedom of religion and constitutional law. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses are
found in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution which provides
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Id.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects persons from unfair procedural, state actions.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits a state from denying to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws. This clause requires that persons under like circumstances be given equal protection in the enjoyment of personal rights and the
prevention and redress of wrongs.
24. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 4. Article 1, section 4 of the California Constitution
provides for the free exercise and enjoyment of religion.
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fendants caused him extreme embarrassment, anxiety, and
fear. 25 He also asserted that he had been prevented from the
exercise of his religious beliefs, and alleged damage to his
personal and professional reputation. 26
The district court denied Vernon's motion for a preliminary injunction, and later granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment in its entirety.27 The claims against
Yaroslavsky were dismissed on grounds of absolute legislative
immunity.28 The court dismissed the claims against Brewer,
stating that his alleged conduct did not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. 29 As to the free exercise claims
against all defendants, the court found that Vernon failed to
both allege or prove a constitutionally cognizable injury.3o As
to the Establishment Clause claims, the court found no triable
issue of material fact, finding that the investigation passed the
"Lemon Test."31 Furthermore, the court found that the city's
actions were justified by a compelling state interest and were
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 32 The court also dismissed the Equal Protection and Due Process Clause claims. 33
Finally, the court dismissed the claims under Article I of
25. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1390.
26. Id. Vernon claimed that the investigation affected his worship, consultation

with his pastor, participation in Christian fellowship, and giving public testimony
to his faith without severe consequences. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. Government officials performing discretionary functions generally have
qualified immunity, shielding them from civil damages liability as long as their
actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are
alleged to have violated. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), on remand
724 F.Supp. 654 (1989), affd 922 F.2d 433 (1990).
29. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1390.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1391. The "Lemon Test" was first enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971). Generally, the test is a three-part method of determining
whether the government is violating the Establishment Clause. Id. See infra notes
45-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "Lemon Test."
32. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1391. A compelling state interest is one which the
state is forced or obliged to protect. Coleman v. Coleman, 291 N.E.2d 530, 534
(Ohio 1972). Protecting against excessive state entanglement with religion has been
held to be a compelling state interest. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ.
of Virginia, 18 F.3d 269, 287 (4th Cir. 1994). A narrowly tailored action is one
which is does not unduly affect interests other than the interest which the action
is attempting to regulate. Id.
33. [d.
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the California Constitution, stating that the analysis would not
differ from that of the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment
Clause claims under the Federal Constitution since in this
particular instance state and federal law were coextensive. 34
Vernon appealed on all claims.35
III. BACKGROUND
A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS THE BASIS FOR FREEDOM OF
RELIGION

The basic premises of freedom of religion are found in the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Two distinct clauses of the First Amendment protect religious freedom. 36 One is the Establishment Clause, which prohibits any
law "respecting an establishment of religion. "37 The other is
the Free Exercise Clause, which bans laws "prohibiting the
free exercise of religion. "38
The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause
combine to protect the freedom of individuals to worship or not
worship as they wish, without governmental interference that
might encourage or discourage religion. 39 Both clauses are
made applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 40

34: [d. The District Court found it unnecessary to address separately Vernon's
state constitutional rights. [d.
35. [d.

36. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
37. [d.
38. [d.

39. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Free Exercise Clause was first held applicable to the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The Establishment Clause was first held applicable to the states in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), rehr'g denied 330 U.S. 855 (1947). See, NOWAK AND RoTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1157 n.2 (4th ed. 1991).
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The Establishment Clause: The Wall Between Church and
State

The Establishment Clause prohibits laws "respecting an
establishment of religion.,,41 It is this clause which is said to
create the "wall" between church and state. 42 In Everson v.
Board of Education, the Court elaborated on what types of
governmental actions would clearly violate the Establishment
Clause. 43 The Court stated that government may not (1) set
up an official church; (2) force or influence a person to profess
a belief or disbelief in religion; (3) punish a person for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs; (4) prefer
one religion over another; or (5) participate in the affairs of
religious organizations. 44
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court applied a three-part test
to determine whether the government was violating one of the
above Establishment Clause prohibitions. 45 The governmental
action must satisfy each of following conditions to be valid: (1)
it must have a secular purpose; (2) its primary effect must
neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) it must not foster
excessive government entanglement. 46

2.

The Free Exercise Clause: Freedom to Believe, Freedom to
Act
The Free Exercise Clause bars the government from mak-

41. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
42. This "strict separation theory" attributed to Thomas Jefferson was accepted
by both the majority and the dissenters in Everson, which upheld publicly funded
transportation for parochial school pupils along with others. See generally, LAwRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1166 (Foundation Press, 2nd Ed.
1988), which further notes that "The very fact that Justices who agreed on the
governing principle could divide so sharply on the result suggests that the principle evoked by the image of a wall furnishes less guidance than metaphor." See
also Everson, 330 U.S. at 14.
43. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. I, 15 (1947).
44. ld.
45. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S 602, 612 (1971).
46. ld. See NowAK, ROTUNDA, AND YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 851 (3d ed.
1986) in which the authors infer a fourth requirement that the governmental action must not create an excessive degree of political division along religious lines.
The authors elaborate on the fourth condition by noting that it seems to be simply
an aspect of the requirement of no "excessive entanglement."
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ing any law "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. 47 In
practice, the Supreme Court has invalidated very few government actions on the basis of the Free Exercise Clause. 48
The Free Exercise Clause strictly forbids the outlawing of
any religious belief, but is ambiguous as to what types of conduct it may not prohibit. 49 Generally, when a government action negatively affects a particular type of conduct which has
been dictated by an individual's religion, that act violates the
Free Exercise Clause. 5o Furthermore, where the statute is not
motivated by an intent to interfere with religiously-related
conduct, but the statute nonetheless has that effect, the Court
has applied a test of heightened scrutiny.51 This means that
the state, as defendant, must demonstrate first, that the regulation pursues a particularly important governmental goal, and
second, that an exemption would substantially hinder the fulfillment of that goa1. 52 This constitutional principle has been
named the "Burdensome Effect" test. 53
Currently, when state regulations have the unintended
effect of burdening religious beliefs, the court will uphold such
laws only when they are the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling state objective. 54 In particular, where
47. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. V. Smith, 742
F.2d 193, on remand 698 F.Supp. 1342 (5th Cir. 1984) for a detailed explication of
the generalization, "freedom to believe, freedom to act."
48. ROTUNDA AND NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 519 (2d ed.
1986).
49. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986) (stating that the freedom
of individual belief is absolute, but the freedom of individual conduct is not). See
also Forest Hills Early Learning Center, Inc. v. Lukhard, 728 F.2d 230, 240 (4th
Cir. 1984), appeal after remand 789 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1986).
50. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (striking down a law
that negatively affected Amish home schooling by initiating compulsory high school
attendance).
51. See, e.g., Ogden v. U.S., 758 F.2d 1168, 1179 (7th Cir. 1985) (using the
traditional standard of review utilized in First Amendment challenges in a civilian
context: a state regulation of free exercise will be subjected to strict scrutiny and
will be upheld only if it is narrowly drawn and justified by a compelling state
interest).
52. See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1261-62 (2d ed.
1988).
53. See, e.g., U.S. v. Columbus Mun. Sch. Dist., 558 F.2d 228, 231 (1977) (using the term "Burdensome Effect").
54. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assoc., 485 U.S. 439
(1986).
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the state's objective could be served as well, or almost as well,
by granting an exemption to those whose religious beliefs are
burdened by the regulation, such an exemption must be given. 55
The modern approach to exemptions is best seen in
Sherbert v. Verner. 56 Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist, was
fired for refusing to work on Saturdays, her religion's Sabbath. 57 All other available jobs required that she be willing to
work on Saturdays.58 The state refused to give her unemployment compensation benefits, stating that she had declined to
accept "suitable work when offered."59 The Supreme Court
reversed and held that the state's refusal violated her right to
the free exercise of her religion. 60 The Court reasoned that
South Carolina's policy burdened Sherbert's free exercise of
religion because it forced her to choose between receiving benefits and following her religion. 61 This choice placed "the same
kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a
fine imposed against [her] for her Saturday worship. ~2 Furthermore, the Court stated that there was a discriminatory
component to the state's action, since Sunday worshippers did
not have to make this choice. 63
However, in order to win the suit, it was not enough that
Sherbert prove that her free exercise rights were burdened. 54
The Court stated that Sherbert also had to prove that there
was no compelling state interest that justified the government
policy, and that the interest could be satisfied in a less burdensome manner.65 In Sherbert's case, the Court found that no
showing was made by the state that an exemption for Sabbat-

55. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
56. [d. at 398.
57. [d. at 402. Sherbert's employer operated a textile mill. [d. at 399.
58. [d. at 402.
59. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401.
60. [d. at 410.
61. [d. at 404.
62. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
63. [d.
64. [d. at 406.
65. [d.
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arians would prevent the state from achieving its objective. 66

.B.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In recent cases, the Supreme Court has announced its
willingness to reexamine its positions regarding the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
1.

The Establishment Clause: A Possible Movement Toward a
One-Part Test

The Supreme Court may be dissatisfied with the Lemon
three-part test and may instead move to a single, one-part
test. 67 If the Court rejects Lemon in the future, the Ninth
Circuit's reliance on Lemon may be questionable. 66 In Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, the Supreme Court majority opinion
stated that the main test was whether the law "constitutes an
endorsement of one or another set of religious beliefs or of
religion generally. "69
Furthermore, in Lee v. Weisman, the Court was asked to
abandon Lemon, but refused to do SO.70 The four dissenting
Justices in Lee agreed that the three-part test should be replaced in favor of a test asking only whether government has
coerced participation in, or endorsed, a sectarian observance.71
Indeed, Justice Kennedy, author of the Lee majority opinion,
suggested that the Court did not approve of the Lemon test,
stating that Lee could be decided without reconsidering Lem-

66. [d. at 19. The court stated, "[n]othing we say today constrains the states
to adopt any particular form or scheme of unemployment compensation." [d.
67. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
68. [d.
69. [d. at 17.

70. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992). The Court stated, "(T]hus
we do not accept the invitation of petitioners and amicus the United States to
reconsider our decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman." [d. Justice Kennedy wrote the
majority opinion. [d. at 2655. Justice Souter wrote an opinion concurring in both
the judgment and the majority opinion that was joined by Justices Stevens and
O'Connor. [d. at 2667. Justice Blackmun with whom Stevens and O'Connor join
also filed an opinion in the case in which he noted that nothing in this decision
formally altered, or was inconsistent with, the Court's Establishment Clause decisions during the previous two decades. [d. at 2611.
71. See Lee, 112 S. Ct at 2652 (Scalia, J. dissenting; with whom White, J.,
Thomas, J. and Rehnquist, C.J. joined).
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on.72 Justice Kennedy argued that the government conduct in
Lee, the offering of a prayer at a public high school commencement, represented official government endorsement and coercion of religion. 7s Justice Kennedy found that such endorsement and coercion was a violation of the Establishment Clause
no matter which standard was applied. 74 Therefore, if presented with a case that could not be easily decided without
considering the Lemon test, the majority of the Court would
likely abandon the test. 75
2.

The Free Exercise Clause: An Increased Burden for
Plaintiffs

Recently, the Supreme Court has increased the plaintiffs
burden in claims alleging a violation of Free Exercise rights.
The Court has relaxed the standard it applies in testing government granted exemptions76 and has given plaintiffs the
added requirement of proving government coercion of religious
activity.77
a.

A Possible Departure from Strict Scrutiny in the Area of
Exemptions

Employment Division v. Smith 78 suggests that the
Sherbert rule, requiring exemptions to be given where feasible,
will be dramatically cut back by the Rehnquist Court. In
Smith, a 5-4 decision held that a generally applicable criminal
law is automatically enforceable, apparently regardless of the
degree of burden it causes on an individual's religious beliefs.79 Therefore, it follows that a governmental refusal to
72. ld. at 2655.
73. ld. at 2657.
74. ld.
75. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. 1; see also Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2649.
76. See infra notes 78-88 and accompanying text for further discussion.
77. See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text for further discussion.
78. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
79. ld. Smith was a Native American who participated in sacramental peyote
use. Peyote had been determined by Oregon State to be a controlled substance. ld.
at 874. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, held that: (1) th~
Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit application of Oregon drug laws to the ceremonial ingestion of peyote, and (2) thus the state could, consistent with the Free
Exercise Clause, deny claimants unemployment compensation for work-related misconduct based on use of the drug. The majority wrote that "the right of free exer-
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grant an exemption would no longer be held to the high standard of strict scrutiny.
Furthermore, although none of the recent cases involving
the Free Exercise Clause have been explicitly overruled by the
Supreme Court, it is important to note that the current Court
has rejected the balancing test used in past decisions. so For
example, in 1993, in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.,sl
the majority of the Court described the current Free Exercise
Clause standard as follows:
[A] law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling government interest even if the law has the incidental
effect of burdening a particular religious practice ... A law failing to satisfy these requirements [the neutrality and general applicability
requirements] must be justified by a compelling
governmental interest and must be narrowly
tailored to advance that interest. s2

The Lukumi Court endorsed the ruling in Smith, in which
the Court had refused to require religiously based exemptions
for a religiously neutral, generally applicable law prohibiting
the use of certain drugs. 83 The Lukumi Court further endorsed the principle, recognized in Smith, that a law which is
either designed to burden or suppress religious beliefs, or
which prohibits an action solely because of its religious significance, violates the Free Exercise Clause. 84 A law that is not a
religiously neutral law of general applicability will be subject
to strict judicial scrutiny and the compelling interest test.S5
In Lukumi, the unanimous Court invalidated a city ordinance that prohibited certain types of animal slaughter be-

cise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes . . .
conduct that his religion prescribes. . . ." [d. at 879.
80. ROTUNDA AND NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 62 (2d ed. Supp.
1994).
81. 113 S. Ct 2217 (1993).
82. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2226 (1993).
83. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
84. [d.
85. [d.
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cause the Court found that the ordinance was designed solely
to suppress a particular religious sect. 86 The ordinance had
prohibited virtually no other types of animal slaughter, except
that used by the religious sect, and the city had not adopted
the law until it was informed that the religious sect planned to
conduct the slaughtering rituals within the city.87 This city
ordinance was invalidated by the Court because the city could
not identify any compelling interest that would require banning only the type of animal slaughter used in the religion's
rituals. 88

Lukumi is significant because it illustrates the current
Free Exercise Clause standard which disavows a balancing
test, and because it constitutes a continuing endorsement of
Smith.
b.

A New Requirement of Coercion?

A related development concerns a possible new requirement of coercion when proving a violation of free exercise
rights. It is well established that the courts will not grant an
individual an absolute right to practice his or her religion free
from all governmental interference. 89 On the other hand, the
government may not actively "coerce" the individual to act or
not act religiously.90 Somewhere between these two extremes
lies government action which does not coerce, but which nonetheless has the effect of making it much more difficult for the
individual to practice his or her religion. 91

86. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2221.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Bollenbach v. Board of Educ. of Monroe-Woodbury Cent. School Dist.,
659 F.Supp at 1467 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), standing for the proposition that although
there is an absolute freedom to hold religious beliefs, the freedom to act upon
those beliefs is not absolute. See also Alabama and Coushatta Tribes of Texas v.
Trustees of Big Sandy Independent School Dist., 817 F.Supp. lit 1330 (E.D. Tex.
1993).
90. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. at 699-700 (stating that "the GQvernment may not
insist that [people) engage in any set form of religious observance").
91. See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text for further discussion on the
modern resolution of these two extremes.
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Until recently, the Supreme Court found that this "middle
ground" government action violated the Free Exercise
Clause. 92 However, in 1988, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assoc., the Supreme Court held that the federal
government could construct a road through federal land, resulting in the destruction of certain American Indians' traditional rituals, with only a slight gain to any federal interest. 93
In Lyng, the Supreme Court has implicitly ruled that the government may take actions which interfere with religious practice even where the governmental interest in the action is very
weak, and the burden to the individual's practice of his religion
is very great. 94 Lyng is significant in that the concept of "coercion" now appears to be central to free exercise analysis. 95
Therefore, if the individual is not being intentionally induced
to do or not do something, there is no free exercise claim, and
the government is not required to justify its acts.
Notably, Brennan's dissent in Lyng contended that where
a government action posed a "substantial and realistic threat
of frustrating. . . religious practices," the government should
bear the burden of "com[ing] forward with a compelling state
interest sufficient to justify the infringement of those practices.,,96 Brennan's dissent illustrates his support for retaining
the traditional interpretation of Sherbert, namely that the
government must justify its action by showing a compelling
state interest that can not be satisfied in a less burdensome
manner.97

92. Justice Brennan wrote in his dissent in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assoc., 485 U.S. at 465, "Since our recognition nearly half a centu·
ry ago that restraints on religious conduct implicate the concerns of the Free Exercise Clause, . . . we have never suggested that the protections of the guarantee
are limited to so narrow a range of governmental burdens."
93. [d. at 445. Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion, joined by
Rehnquist, White, Stevens, and Scalia. Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justices Marshall and Black. Justice Kennedy took no part in the proceedings.
94. [d. at 450.
95. [d.
96. [d. at 475.

97. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Ninth Circuit began its analysis of Vernon by reiterating well-established law concerning the standard of review. 98
First, the court stated that summary judgment is appropriate
where no genuine issues of material fact remain and. the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.99
Second, as to any claims under California law, the court
stated that "a federal court interpreting state law is bound by
the decisions of the highest state court. "100 The court stressed
that when the state court has not stated a clear rule, the federal court must determine what result the highest state court
would reach based on existing state law. 101
Therefore, the court stated that it would view the evidence
in the light most favorable to Vernon when deciding (1) whether there existed any genuine issues of material fact; and (2)
whether the district court properly applied the relevant substantive law. 102

98. See Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, et. aI., 27 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir.
1994).
99. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1391 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catpett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986».
100. [d. (citing Hewitt v. Joyner, 940 F.2d 1561, 1565 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 969 (1992); In re Kirkland, 915 F.2d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir.
1990». In California, the highest state court is the California Supreme Court.
101. See Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1391. See also Hewitt v. Joyner, 940 F.2d 1561,
1565, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 969 (1992); Kirkland, 915 F.2d at 1239; Moisbergen
v. United States, 757 F.2d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 934
(1985).
102. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1391.
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CLAIMS UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION: FEDERAL
LAw APPLIED FOR LACK OF DIRECTLY APPLICABLE
CALIFORNIA CASE LAw

In determining whether the district court properly applied
the relevant substantive law, the Ninth Circuit first determined whether alternative state grounds were available. loa If
alternative state grounds are available, a court will usually
avoid adjudication of federal constitutional claims. 104 If, however, the federal and state constitutional provisions are coextensive, the court may decide the federal claims because that
analysis would include the state claims.l05 When state constitutional provisions are more expansive in their protection, the
court must address the state federal constitutional claims. IDS
In Vernon, the court found no federal or state cases directly applicable. l07 Therefore, the court stated that it would apply general principles common to both federal and state constitutional doctrines as they relate to the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. IDS
C.

FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS: MERE "CHILLING OF RELIGIOUS
BEHAVIOR DOES NOT CONSTITUTE SUBSTANTIAL
BURDENING

In determining whether Vernon's Free Exercise claim
would prevail, the Ninth Circuit asked whether Vernon's religious belief had been substantially burdened. 109 If so, the
government's acts would violate the United States Constitu-

103. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1392.
104. [d. at 1391-92. See also Hewitt, 940 F.2d at 1565 (citing Siler v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909»; Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768
F.2d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 1985).
105. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1392 (citing Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n v. Eu, 979
F.2d 697, 705 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992».
106. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1392 (citing Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518,
1524 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2707 (1994); Hewitt, 940 F.2d at
1565).
107. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1392.
108. [d.
109. Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, et aI., 27 F.3d 1385, 1392 (9th Cir. 1994).
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tion.l1O The First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the "free exercise of religion."m Article I, Section 4 of the California Constitution provides for the "Free
exercise and enjoyment of religion. . . . Liberty of conscience
does not excuse acts that are licentious or inconsistent with
the peace or safety of the State."112 California case law suggests that an analysis of freedom of religion claims is generally
similar under both federal and state law. 113 In fact, in 1963
the California Supreme Court adopted the federal test enunciated in Sherbert v. Verner. 114
In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court used a balancing test to
determine whether government actions that substantially burdened a religious practice were justified by a compelling state
interest whether the government action was narrowly tailored
to achieve that interest.u6 The balancing test asks whether
there is a less discriminatory method of achieving the means,
and whether the government actions discriminate between
religions, or between religion and nonreligion. 116
The district court denied the free exercise claims, finding
that the plaintiff had not established that his right to freely
exercise his religion had been substantially burdened by the
government's actions.1l7 The district court noted that a plaintiff cannot show substantial burden by merely alleging that
government actions subjectively "chilled" his religious behav-

110. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1392.
111. [d. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I). See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying
text for a further discussion of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of
religion.
112. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1392 (citing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4).
113. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1392 (citing Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46,
56-57 (Cal. 1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989».
114. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1392 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398 (1963». See also
People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 815-16 (Cal. 1964). See also Walker v. Superior
Court, 763 P.2d 852, 869-71 (Cal. 1988) (applying federal balancing test and compelling state interest analysis as a matter of state constitutional law), cert. denied,
491 U.S. 905 (1989).
115. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1392 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403). See supra notes
56-66 and accompanying text.
116. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1393 (citing Molko, 762 P.2d at 57). Note that this is
almost identical to the strict scrutiny test with the added question of whether it
discriminates between two types of classifiers. [d.
117. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1393.
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ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CLAIMS: GoVERNMENT
DISAPPROVE OR APPROVE OF RELIGION

MAy NOT

222

ior.118
D.

Vernon's Establishment Clause claim contended that the
City's investigation violated the government's constitutionally
mandated neutrality toward religion. 119 The United States
Constitution prohibits any law that "establishes" a religion. 12o
The California Constitution states that "the Legislature shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion. ,,121 The
California Constitution further guarantees "free exercise and
enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference,,,122 and in this way is more expansive than the Federal
Constitution. ,,123
1.

The Lemon v. Kurtzman 3-Part Analysis Applied

The Court in Vernon began its Establishment Clause analysis by reiterating the First Amendment ideal that forbids the
government from disapproving of a particular religion or of
religion in general. 124 The court noted that the government
must be neutral and may not disapprove or approve of religion. 125
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court articulated the modern
test to determine a law's constitutionality under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 126 According to this
test, the action must: (1) have a secular purpose; (2) have a
primary effect which neither advances or inhibits religion; and

118. [d. at 1394 (citing Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972); Presbyterian
Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 522 (9th Cir. 1989».
119. Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, et aI., 27 F.3d 1385, 1396 (9th Cir. 1994).
120. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1395 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I).
121. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1395 (citing CAL. CONST. art I, § 4).
122. CAL. CONST. art I, § 4.
123. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1395. However, California's more expansive clause only
applies in certain situations and doesn't apply in this particular case. See infra
notes 143-148 and accompanying text for further elaboration on how California's
"No Preference Clause" expands the Federal Constitution.
124. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1396.
125. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1396 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104
(1968». See also School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963).
126. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1396 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text for a parallel discussion.
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(3) not foster excessive state entanglement with religion. 127
As to the first prong, the Ninth Circuit used its own case

law, which states that if the action has more than one purpose,
the action will pass constitutional muster if at least one. of the
purposes is secular, regardless of how many purposes may be
non-secular. 128 In Vernon, the Ninth Circuit recognized that
the United States Supreme Court has used a slightly more
stringent approach, which requires that the primary purpose of
the action be secular. 129 However, the Ninth Circuit found
that no matter which approach was used, the action passed the
first prong of the test. 130
The court made this. determination by looking at
Yaroslavsky's letter, Lomax's memorandum, the Board meeting, and Chief Gates' declaration. 131 Each of these items had
at least once mentioned that the purpose of the investigation
was to determine whether the operations and policies of the
LAPD were being improperly compromised by Vernon. 132 The
court found that the department's fear that Vernon's religious
beliefs might have affected his job was a valid secular purpose
and was the primary purpose of the investigation. 133
As to the second prong of the test, the court determined
whether the investigation could be reasonably construed as
sending a message either endorsing or disapproving of religion. 134 The Ninth Circuit ultimately agreed with the district
court, focusing on whether the action 'primarily' disapproved of
religious beliefs. After reviewing Yaroslavsky's letter and
Lomax's memorandum, and the prominent disclaimers contained therein, the court found that the action did not primarily disapprove of religion. 135

127. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1396 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13).
I
128. [d. at 1397.
129. [d. See Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 782-83 (9th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992).
130. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1398.
131. [d.
132. [d.
133. [d.
134. [d.
135. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1399.
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As to the third prong of the Lemon test, the court noted

that administrative entanglement typically involves comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance of
religion. 136 The Lemon test gives three factors to determine
this prong of the test: (1) The character and purpose of the
religious institution affected; (2) the nature of the activity that
the government mandates; and (3) the resulting relationship
between the government and the religious institution. 137
The court found that Vernon failed to present a clear argument as to the first factor. 13S The government's actions were
not directed toward the Church itself, only toward Vernon. As
to the second factor, the court concluded that the government's
action was closely connected to the institution's religious
charge. 139 As to the third factor, the court noted that there
was no continuing or systematic investigation of religious beliefs.140 The government's investigation of Vernon was limited
in scope, had a justifiably secular purpose, and did not require
the government to make religious versus secular determinations or to engage in ongoing monitoring. 141
2.

California's No Preference Clause is Not Applicable in
Vernon's Establishment Clause Analysis

In its Establishment Clause analysis, the Ninth Circuit
noted the possible application of California's "No Preference
Clause."142 California's "No Preference Clause" is the state's
restatement of the United States Constitution's Establishment
Clause. 143 The court in Vernon noted that the California "No
Preference Clause" is more expansive than the federal Establishment Clause. 144 Therefore, the fact that the court applied
federal law may have had an effect on the court's decision
since California gives greater deference to freedom of reli-

136. [d. (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619-22). Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
684 (1984). See also Cammack, 932 F.2d at 781.
137. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1399 (citing Lemon; 403 U.S. at 615).
138. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1399.
139. [d.
140. [d. at 1400.
141. [d. at 1401.
142. [d.
143. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
144. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1402.
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gion. 145
However, California's "No Preference Clause" is more expansive only insofar as it encompasses more government action
which aids religion, not insofar as it hinders or stigmatizes
religion; therefore, the application of either the state or federal
law would be identical. l46 For example, Vernon did not contend that the state's investigation discriminated against him
by favoring his religion. Thus, the government's actions could
not have violated the No Preference Clause as it is expansively
read by California. 147
Based on the preceding analysis, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's analysis that Vernon had failed to
prove that the City's investigation had violated either his Free
Exercise or Establishment Clause rights. 148
V.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit held that Vernon had failed to meet the
threshold test of establishing that his right to freely exercise
his religion had been substantially burdened. 149 The court
further held that Vernon had failed to prove his claim that he
could no longer worship or associate freely. ISO Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit found it proper, for a city to conduct an investigation into the religious beliefs of its employee, when the city
is concerned that those beliefs might affect job performance.
Wendy L. Wilbanks'

145. See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text.
146. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1402.
147. Id.
148. Id. As to the City's claim for attorneys' fees, the Court stated that the
same standard applies when analyzing requests for attorneys' fees at both the trial
and appellate levels. The mere fact that a party prevails does not entitle that
party to attorneys' fees unless it would be "unjust" not to award them. It would
be unjust if the actions were found to be "unreasonable, frivolous, meritless, or
vexatious." The court reasoned that because none of these applied, defendants'
attorneys' fees were denied. Id.
149. Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, et aI., 27 F.3d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1994).
150. Id.
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1996.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995

21

